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ABSTRACT: The paper compares free trade with autarky in an asymmetric multi-
country world with Cournot competition, constant returns and linear demand. We first 
derive conditions for free trade to hurt a country’s consumers, to benefit its firms, to 
induce it to export, to increase its output, and to raise its welfare. We further show these 
conditions are linked in a clear order, with each one implying the next. We then 
demonstrate that with different reservation prices trade can reduce world output and total 
consumer surplus as well as world welfare and correct oversights in earlier findings by 
Dong and Yuan (2010). 
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1. Introduction 
This paper re-examines the effects of free trade compared to autarky in the 
classic partial equilibrium Cournot model with linear demand and cost functions, a 
fixed number of firms and integrated markets without trading costs. Helpman and 
Krugman (1985, p. 88) observe that in this setting, “the direction of trade cannot as in a 
purely competitive model, be determined simply by a comparison of costs or of pretrade 
prices. There are three sets of variables here - costs, market sizes, and numbers of firms 
- and all must be taken into account.”  
Starting with Helpman and Krugman, (1985), the literature has identified 
conditions under which trade leads to certain effects on a country, such as increasing 
consumer surplus, increasing profits, inducing the country to export or import, 
increasing production or welfare. A number of papers have also demonstrated that these 
effects are connected. For example, Markusen (1981), Cordella (1993) and Dong and 
Yuan (2010) (D&Y) use two-country models to show that a country’s welfare can only 
fall under free trade if the country is an importer and consumers can only be worse off if 
firms are better off. However, the literature has not identified general conditions in an 
asymmetric world with more than two countries.  
The first objective of this paper is to extend the earlier findings and provide 
simple conditions for these effects and their relations. In particular, we show that there 
is a clear ranking among these conditions: If free trade hurts a country’s consumers, it 
must benefit its firms. If trade benefits firms, the country must be an exporter and this in 
turn implies that its output rises. Finally, if a country’s output rises, so does its welfare.  
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The second goal of this paper is to investigate the possibility for free trade to 
lower world welfare, total consumer surplus and output in a simple linear Cournot 
model. It is well known that there exist special situations where trade has undesirable 
effects1 and D&Y recently derived a necessary and sufficient condition for free trade 
to lower total welfare with two countries. Their analysis, however, contains several 
oversights. We clarify these errors and demonstrate that in a more general model trade 
not only can reduce world welfare but also world output and consumer surplus. 
2. Model 
 There are m (≥ 2) countries. Every Country i’s has a representative consumer 
with a quadratic utility function iz + ii ya – 0.5 ib y 2i , where iz  is the numeraire good and 
iy is the consumption of the oligopoly good. Utility maximization implies an inverse 
demand function ip  = ia – ii yb . There are in  (≥ 1) firms in each country which have 
identical and constant marginal cost ic < ia . In equilibrium, every firm chooses its output 
iq  to maximize its profit ( ip  – ic ) iq . Under autarky, the first-order condition ip  – ic  – 
iiqb  = 0 yields the Cournot equilibrium price: p Ai  = 1i iiin cna . A country’s autarky output 
must be equal to its consumption, so we have in q
A
i  = y
A
i  = )1(
)( ii iii nb can .      
                                                          
1
 The insight that trade can harm individual countries goes back to Bhagwati (1971) and Johnson (1965). 
Situations where trade can reduce world welfare include: inefficient specialization (Krugman 1979, 
Markusen 1981, Eckel 2008), segmented markets and transportation costs (Brander and Krugman 1983), 
the absence of insurance markets (Newbery and Stiglitz 1984), strongly increasing returns and non-linear 
demand (Markusen and Melvin 1988), firms’ location choice (Eaton and Kierzkowski 1984), increasing 
dispersion of markups (Epifani and Gancia 2011). None of these effects are present in our model. 
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 Under free trade, there is a single world price of p
T
. Country i’s demand will be 
iy = ( ia – pT)/ ib  and the world total demand yT   mi
i
T
i
b
pa
1
. Using   mi ib1 /1 to 
indicate the size of the world market, we can write the equilibrium price with free trade 
as pT = 1 ( ni iiba1  – yT). When every firm in Country i maximizes its profit (pT – ic ) iq
, the first-order condition is pT – ic  – iq / = 0. A firm’s output is qTi = (pT – ic ) and the 
world total output and consumption yT =  mi Tiiqn1 . The total number of firms is denoted 
by N  mi in1 . The equilibrium price can be solved as: 
  pT = 
1
1N )(1 iimi ii cnba          (1) 
 We assume min{ ia }  pT  max{ ic }, so that consumers and firms in all 
countries are active in the market under free trade. Country i’s consumer surplus iCS  = 
ii ya  – 0.5 ib y 2i  – ii yp  = 0.5( ia – ip )2/ ib , total profit i  = iiqn ( ip  – ic ) and social 
welfare iSW  = 0.5( ia – ip )2/ ib  + iiqn ( ip  – ic ). The respective values can be found by 
substituting ip  and iq  under free trade and autarky, as solved above. Next we will 
investigate the effect of trade on individual countries.      
3. The Effects of Trade  
 In this section we consider the effects of trade on a country’s welfare, consumer 
surplus, profits, trade position and output. A key variable that will help us simplify 
mathematical expressions is the ratio of the price margin under autarky over the 
margin under free trade, (p Ai – ic )/(pT – ic ). We denote this ratio by id . 
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  The value of id  depends in an interesting way on the model’s primitives, and 
more specifically on the average cost and reservation price. Using (1) we can express 
pT
 
 ic  as the sum of  mj
j
j
b
a
1  – ic  and   mj ijj ccn1 )( divided by N + 1. The price 
margin under autarky p Ai – ic can be viewed as a special case of this expression with 
only one country i. If ic  is equal to the average cost  mj jjcn1 /N, the second term of 
pT
 
– ic disappears. Similarly, the first term reduces to ia  – ic  if ia  is equal to
 mj
j
j
b
a
1  , which can be interpreted as the world’s (size weighted) average 
reservation price as mj
jb1
1  = 1. Hence, if a country’s reservation price and costs are 
equal to the world averages, we have id = (N + 1)/( in + 1) > 1, indicating that the 
change of price caused by trade only depends on the number of firms under autarky 
and free trade, but is independent of how costs and reservation prices are distributed. 
If ic  is lower than the average cost, or if ia  is lower than the average reservation 
price, id  will be smaller than this value, as less efficient foreign firms and higher 
foreign demand weaken competition. When ic  and ia  are sufficiently low, id  can be 
lower than 1, implying a higher price under free trade. Next we will use id  to express 
various conditions for certain effects due to free trade. 
 (i) Consumer surplus: Consumers gain or lose if and only if free trade decreases 
or increases the price, i.e., whether p
T
 < p Ai , or id  > 1. The value of id depends on every 
parameter in this model through p
T
. However, we can obtain a sufficient condition for id  
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> 1, which only depends on a country’s reservation price ia , and mj
j
j
b
a
1  . So we have a 
sufficient condition for free trade to benefit a country’s consumers (see Appendix I). 
  Proposition 1: Free trade benefits a country’s consumers if its reservation price 
is not lower than the world average reservation price.  
 The literature (e.g. D&Y) often assumes ia  = a, for all i, which guarantees the 
condition. Hence, if all countries have the same reservation price, all consumers are 
better off under free trade compared to autarky. Usually consumers in rich countries tend 
to have higher reservation prices and are therefore more likely to benefit from trade than 
their counterparts from poor countries.   
 (ii) Profit: Intuitively, the interest of firms and consumers regarding trade are not 
necessarily aligned. When producers suffer from imported goods, consumers usually 
benefit. Likewise, if high export demand increases prices, consumers will suffer, but 
firms generate high profits. To find conditions under which firms benefit from trade, we 
need to compare their profit under free trade, (p
T – ic )q Ti =  (pT – ic )2 with that under 
autarky, i.e. (p Ai – ic )q Ai  = ( ia – ic )2/( in  + 1)2 ib . Clearly, the former is larger than the 
latter if and only if ib (pT – ic ) > ( ia  – ic )/( in + 1), or id < ib . Hence, we have: 
  Proposition 2: Free trade benefits a country’s firms if and only if id  < ib .  
 Since ib > 1, it is impossible to have id < 1 and id > ib simultaneously. 
Hence, consumers and firms cannot both be worse off. Furthermore, as id < 1 implies id  
< ib , a reduction in consumer surplus implies an increase in profits. Likewise, as id  
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> ib  implies id > 1, lower profits means higher consumer surplus. Note, that for 
firms’ profits to increase, pT does not need to be higher than p Ai .  As the price under free 
trade is less sensitive to a firm’s output than under autarky ( > 1/ ib ), a firm produces 
more even if prices do not change. So it is better off as long as p
T 
is not too much lower 
than p Ai . The larger the relative increase in market size indicated by  ib , the lower pT can 
be without making the firms worse off.  
 (iii) Export/Import: While D&Y and others show that an exporting country must 
be better off under free trade in a two-country model, this relation may change in a 
multi-country setting as now one country’s export does not any more correspond to the 
other country’s import. To find out if a country is exporting under free trade, we need to 
compare its output in q
T
i =  in (pT – ic ) to its consumption, y Ti = ( ia  – pT)/ ib , i.e., 
whether  in (pT – ic ) > ( ia  – pT)/ ib . Hence, we have: 
 Proposition 3: A country exports if and only if id <
i
ii
n
nb11  .  
 It is easy to see that id < ib implies id < (1 +  ib in )/(1 + in ). So, if a country 
has higher profits under free trade, it must be exporting, but the reserve is not necessarily 
true. Common sense seems to suggest the opposite: an exporting country should generate 
higher profits under free trade. In fact, a country is more likely to export than to earn 
higher profits, because free trade generally depresses prices even if it increases demand. 
 (iv) Output: Free trade generally stimulates production, because firms know that 
an increase in their output has less impact on the price and will consequently produce 
more, given the same price. However, as D&Y have shown, it is possible that a low cost 
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country ends up producing less, due to an excessive output expansion by a high cost 
country. A rise in Country i‘s production requires that every firm’s output under free 
trade q Ti =  (pT – ic ) exceeds that under autarky, ( ia  – ic )/ ib ( in  + 1). Comparing these 
two terms we obtain: 
  Proposition 4: A country’s output rises under free trade if and only if id <  ib . 
 Note, that  ib > (1 +  ib in )/(1 + in ) always holds. So if a country exports, i.e. 
id < (1 +  ib in )/(1 + in ), we have id <  ib , i.e. its output must rise.  
 (v) Social Welfare: Since firms and consumers cannot both lose under free trade,  
a country’s welfare may fall either if its firms’ loss in profits exceeds its consumers’ 
gain, or if its’ firms gains are lower that it’s decrease in consumers surplus. Interestingly, 
we will show that the latter is impossible: A welfare loss can only occur when firms lose 
and consumers gain. We find that free trade always benefits a country as a whole if i  ≡ 
in – 2( ib  – 1) < 0. If the country has few firms, consumers are likely to benefit from 
trade. If the world market is much larger than the home market (high  ib ), firms are 
likely to gain. So firms’ loss cannot exceed consumers’ gain. When this condition fails, 
welfare will fall when id is sufficiently close to 1 + in . We can obtain a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a country’s welfare loss (see Appendix II): 
 Proposition 5: Free trade will reduce a country’s social welfare if and only if i  
> 0 and │1 + in  – id │< iin  .   
 This result indicates the trade-off between consumers’ gain and firms’ loss. If id  
< 1, we have p
T
 > p Ai , hence consumers lose, firms gain, and welfare always rises. When 
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id > 1, consumers gain but firms may not lose as we explained earlier. Since the market 
is less sensitive to a firm’s output ( > 1/ ib ), profit still rises as long as id < ib . When 
id > ib , free trade benefits consumers but hurts firms. As id rises further to satisfy the 
condition in Proposition 5, consumers’ gain is equal to firms’ loss, and welfare does not 
change. For an even higher id  total welfare falls under free trade until the condition is 
met again. Beyond this point a higher id will guarantee that consumers’ gain dominates 
firms’ loss, implying a higher welfare under free trade. Hence, a welfare loss cannot 
happen if id is either too high or too low. If id is very high, p
T
 is relatively low and the 
consumers’ gain will dominate any profit loss. If id is very low, pT is relatively high and 
firms cannot lose enough to offset consumers’ gain.  
 Finally, we can show that an increase in output always ensures a welfare gain. A 
welfare loss requires in > 2( ib  – 1), so in + 1 > 2 ib  – 1 >  ib . An output increase 
implies id <  ib , so we have │1 + in  – id │> │1 + in  –  ib │. Since ( in  + 1 –  ib )2 > 
in i  always, we have │1 + in  – id │> iin  , i.e. welfare must increase.    
 (vi) Relations between Conditions: In the discussion above we have already 
characterized relations between pairs of conditions. Simply by linking these pairwise 
connections we can establish a clear ordering:  
 Proposition 6: If a country’s consumers are worse off under free trade, its firms 
must be better off. If profits increase, the country must export, which implies that its 
output increases. Finally a higher output guarantees a welfare gain for this country. 
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 Conversely, we easily see that, if a country’s social welfare falls under free 
trade, its output must fall, which implies that the country is an importer. This in turn 
means that firms’ profits fall, which implies that consumer surplus must increase. 
 To get some intuition for these relationships, Figure 1 shows how a low cost 
Country 1 is affected when trading with a high cost Country 2. The indifference 
curves show for which combinations of Country 1’s reservation price 1a  and the 
number of firms 1n , its welfare, production, trade position, profits and consumer 
surplus remain unaffected. We also add the indifference curve for the sum of both 
countries’ welfare which indicates the possibility of a world welfare loss.  
. n1 
Figure 1: Indifference curves for Country 1’s consumers, firms, export, production and 
welfare given 2a = 3, 1b = 2b =1, 2n = 9, 1c = 0, 2c = 0.5 
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 In the grey areas at the bottom of this graph, under free trade some firms or 
consumers exit the market, which violates our assumptions. In region a), with very 
low 1a , p
A
1  is lower than pT, implying a loss of consumer surplus. In region b), with 
higher a1, trade reduces prices so consumers are better off. A further increase of 1a  
leads to region c), where firms are worse off, as they lose the high profits they would 
made under autarky. As 1a  continues to rise, we enter region d), where the large 
domestic market starts to attract foreign goods and turns Country 1 to an importer. 
The next region e) has a higher 1a . Now imports force domestic firms to reduce 
production, despite having lower costs. We notice that all indifference curves are 
upward sloping. This is because with higher 1n , the market is more competitive, and 
less affected by Country 2’s high cost producers. We therefore need more increase in 
1a  to move from one region to another. Finally, if 1n > 2 and 1a  further rises we enter 
region f), where Country 1’s welfare decreases. 
 For most parameter values we still find that trade increases consumer surplus, 
decreases profits and raise welfare (regions (c) + (d) + (e)). However, the range of 
parameter constellations for welfare decrease is surprisingly large (region (f)).  
4. Inefficient Trade 
 The above analysis provides some clues for understanding how trade can lead to 
a reduction of world welfare. In the example presented in Figure 1, the inefficient 
Country 2 will always benefit from trade. However, if Country 1 is sufficiently large and 
has sufficient but not too many firms, its welfare loss exceeds Country 2’s welfare gain. 
This will lead to the decrease of world welfare in region g). Essentially, in this case, 
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opening trade is equivalent to allowing the entry of Country 2’s inefficient firms in 
Country 1’s market. We know from Lahiri and Ono (1988) that under Cournot 
competition this can reduce welfare. Unfortunately, it is algebraically very cumbersome 
to provide the precise conditions for this to happen. To our knowledge D&Y are the first 
to have carried out this analysis. However, their result suffers from a few small errors 
which need clarification.  
 D&Y’s model is a special case of our setup with two countries and identical 
reservation prices.  They assume demand functions 1y = a – 1bp , and 2y = (a – 2bp ), 
where 0  is the relative size of the two countries’ demand. To simplify their formulae 
and avoid confusion with our parameters bi, we set their parameter b = 1, without loss of 
generality. We can then write the inverse demand functions as 1p  = a – 1y , and 2p = a – 
2y /. D&Y assume the marginal cost in Country 1 (“Southern”) to be higher than in 
Country 2 (“Northern”), i.e. 1c  > 2c . They argue that a necessary condition for a 
decrease in world welfare is “the displacement of production of the Northern country 
by that of the southern Country” (p. 826). Their Proposition 1 gives a sufficient 
condition for Country 2’s output reduction: 
  
1
)1)(1(
21
22
21
2   nnnncc ca                (2) 
 This condition is incorrect. If the two countries have the same size ( = 1) and 
the same number of firms ( 1n = 2n ), (2) holds, but in this case the low cost Country 2’s 
output should increase. The correct condition can be derived from our Proposition 4, 
which states that Country 2’s output falls if and only if  2b < 2d . Using D&Y’s 
 12 
 
12 
parameter , which corresponds to 1b / 2b  in our notation, we have  2b  = 1 + 1/. Then 
as p A2   2c  = 12 22 n ca and pT  2c = 1 )(21 2112   nn ccnca ,  2b < 2d holds if and only if  
  ( 1n  – 1 – 2n )(a – 2c ) > (1 + )(1 + 2n ) 1n ( 1c  – 2c )             (3)   
 When dividing (3) by 1c – 2c  and  1n –1– 2n , D&Y apparently ignore the 
possibility of a negative sign which will reverse the direction of the inequality. In 
addition their n2 on the right hand side should be 1n . This error seems to have resulted 
in a follow-up mistake. D&Y claim in their Proposition 7 that free trade reduces total 
welfare if and only if 2c  is higher than a particular threshold c
**
2  and Country 2’s relative 
size  is sufficiently small. However, their c **2  is defined, in our notation, as: 
 
)1)](12()1(2[
)]222()1()1(2[)22(
c
112
2
1
212121
2
1121**
2   nnnn nnnnnnncann  (4) 
 This can be simplified to c **2  = 1c + )]12()1(2))[1(
))(22(
12
2
11
121   nnnn cann . Since a > 
1c , we have c
**
2  > 1c . So the condition for total welfare loss, 2c > c
**
2  violates their 
assumption that 1c  > 2c . However, if we assume 2c > 1c , D&Y’s Proposition 7 will be 
essentially correct,2 i.e. the total welfare falls due to free trade if 
11
11n cna > 2c  > c **2  
and  is sufficiently small.  
 In line with the intuition discussed above, it can be shown that the maximum 
welfare loss in this D&Y’s two-country model occurs when  = 0, 1n = 1, 2n = infinity, 
                                                          
2
 There is another small error in the definition of DY’s critical ** = D/F. The term a(2 1n + 2n + 2) in F  
should be a(2 2n + 1n  + 2). 
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i.e. when a large number of inefficient firms from a country with negligible size enters 
an efficient monopoly. The maximum welfare loss in this case is 1/9 of the original 
total welfare, which is quite significant.  
 Furthermore asymmetric demand intercepts in our model increases the scope for 
generating a total welfare loss compared to D&Y’s setup. Figure 1 shows a total welfare 
loss in region g), which does not require extreme parameter combinations and different 
country sizes. In the Appendix we illustrate this with a simple numerical example with 
1b = 2b , (i.e.  = 1 in D&Y’s notation). 
 Asymmetric demand intercepts also lead to another surprising result. In D&Y’s 
model trade will always increase total output and every country’s consumer surplus. This 
is a direct consequence of our Proposition 1, as in their model both countries have 
identical reservation prices. If this restriction is relaxed, we can find parameter 
constellations for which trade decreases world consumer surplus and total output. 
 We illustrate this possibility in Figure 2, representing the combinations of 2a and 
2n  for which world consumer surplus and/or world output decrease. In this case 
consumers in Country 1 lose as its efficient firms export, but the price in Country 2 does 
not fall significantly, resulting in a decrease in total consumer surplus.  
 14 
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Figure 2: Reduction of world output and consumer surplus  
1a = 9, 1b  = 2b = 1, 1n = 1, 1c =0, 2c = 5.25 
 
 Interestingly, whereas world consumer surplus can fall only if would output falls,  
there is a large parameter space where a decrease in output does not lead to a decrease in 
consumer surplus, as trade will allocate the smaller output more efficiently to consumers 
with high demand. Again we provide in the Appendix a numerical example (with 2a = 
12 and 2n  = 20) for a situation where both total output and consumer surplus fall. 
5. Concluding remarks 
 This paper first obtains conditions under which free trade with Cournot 
competition has a positive or negative impact on a country’s consumers, firms, welfare, 
export/import position and output. We then provide a clear ranking for these conditions. 
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In the second part of this paper we clarify some oversights in D&Y’s analysis of welfare 
reducing trade, and illustrate that in a more general model trade can also lead to a 
reduction in world output and total consumer surplus.  
 While theoretically interesting, we do not think, however that our results should 
be viewed as a strong argument against free trade. Except in extreme cases, the 
magnitude of the total welfare loss is very small compared to the potential gains.  
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Appendix I, Proof of Proposition 1:  
Without loss of generality we assume 1a ≥ mi
i
i
b
a
1  , and show 1d > 1, i.e. 
  
1
1N ( mi iiba1   + mi iicn1 ) <  1c + 1111 nca      (A1)  
 (A1) holds if ( 1n + 1)( 1a + mi iicn1 ) <  (N + 1)( 11cn + 1a ), i.e.  
  1a + 11cn > 
1
1 1
nN
n   mi iicn2 .      (A2)  
Let c  = max.{ ic }. As pT > c and 1a ≥ mi
i
i
b
a
1  , we have 1a + mi iicn1 > (N + 1) c , i.e. 
1a + 11cn > (N + 1) c  –  mi iicn2  > ( 1n + 1) c . So (A2) must hold if ( 1n + 1) c  ≥
1
1 1
nN
n  mi iicn2 , which is true as c  = max.{ ic }. Hence (A1) must hold. 
 
Appendix II, Proof of Proposition 5:  
(i) Country i’s welfare under autarky is 0.5( ia  – ic )2[1 – 1/(1 + in )2]/ ib . Under free 
trade, it is 0.5( ia  – pT)2/ ib  +  in (pT – ic )2. The former is larger if and only if  
L  ( ia  – pT)2 + 2 ib  in (pT – ic )2 – ( ia  – ic )2[1 – 2)1( 1 in ] < 0. 
As ∂2L/∂pT2 = 4 ib  in  + 2 > 0, L reaches its minimum when ∂L/∂pT = 0, i.e. pT = ic  +
ii
ii
nb
ca 21  . At this pT, we find the minimum L* = ( ia  – ic )2[ 2)1( 1 in   iinb21 1 ].    
It is positive if 1 + 2 ib in > (1 + in )2, or in < 2( ib  – 1).  
(ii) Let in > 2( ib  – 1), we solve L = 0. After re-arrangement, we get 
  (1 + 2 ib in )(pT – ic )2 – 2( ia  – ic )(pT – ic ) + 22)1( )( i ii nca   = 0   (A3)  
So we have L < 0 if and only if pT – ic lies between the two solutions of (A3), i.e. 
          
ii
ii
nb
ca 21  (1 – iii nn1 ) < pT – ic < iiii nbca 21  (1 + iii nn1 )  
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Given our definition ( ia  – ic )/(pT – ic )(1 + in ) = id , this inequalities can be written as:  
 id [1 + in  – iin  ]
 
< 1 + 2 ib in  < id [1 + in  + iin  ]  
These inequalities hold if and only if │1 + in  – id │< iin  .   
     
Appendix III, Examples: 
Example 1, Total welfare loss under free trade: 
 Assume m = 2, 1a = 14, 2a = 3, 1b = 2b = 1, 1n = 6, 2n = 9, 1c = 0, 2c = 0.5.  
Under autarky, we find p
A
1  = 2 = q
A
1 , p
A
2  = 0.75, q
A
2  = 0.25. As iSW = 0.5( ia – ip )2/ ib + 
iiqn ( ip  – ic ), we  find SW A1  = 0.5×122 + 6×2×2 = 96, and SW A2  = 0.5(3 – 0.75)2 + 9/16 
= 99/32. So the total welfare SW A1  + SW
A
2  = 96 + 99/32 = 99.1. 
Under free trade, we obtain p
T
 = 13/16, q
T
1  = 13/8, q
T
2  = 5/8. Thus we have SW
T
1 = 
0.5×(14 – 13/16)2 + 6×(13/8)(13/16), and SW T2  = 0.5(3 – 13/16)2 + 9×(5/8)(13/16 – 0.5). 
Then we find SW T1 + SW
T
2  = 99 < SW
A
1  + SW
A
2 . 
  
Example 2, Total consumer surplus and output fall under free trade:  
Let m = 2, 1a = 9, 2a = 12, 1b = 2b = 1, 1n = 1, 2n = 20, 1c = 0, 2c = 21/4.  
Under autarky, p
A
1  = 4.5, p
A
2  = 39/7. As iCS = 0.5( ia  – ip )2/ ib , total consumer surplus 
is 0.5(9 – 4.5)2 + 0.5(12 – 39/7)2 = 30.8. Under free trade, pT = 21/4 and total consumer 
surplus is equal to 0.5(9 – 21/4)2 + 0.5(12 – 21/4)2 = 29.8 < 30.8.   
For total output under autarky we have 1n q
A
1 + 2n q
A
2 = 4.5 + 45/7 = 10.9 whereas 
under free trade 1n q
T
1  = 10.5 and 2n q
T
2  = 0. So the world output is 10.5 < 10.9. 
 
